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Five years passed since, in April, 2000, Kurt Koenigsfest took over as the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer at Banco Solidario
S.A. (BancoSol), in La Paz, Bolivia. BancoSol had become the top Latin American bank specializing in providing
microbusiness services. Since its beginning in 1992, BancoSol achieved excellent results and became an interna-
tional reference in the microcredit area. In mid-2000, external and internal factors caused its performance to
deteriorate. Kurt and his management team set and implemented a strategy that led the bank to be rated as
the best ﬁnancial institution in the Bolivian ﬁnancial system in 2004. The time had come to plan for the future;
the management team has to establish BancoSol's primary lines of action for the next three years.








1.1. The economic situation
In 1985, Bolivia underwent one of the worst economic crises in its
history. The budget deﬁcit produced severe hyperinﬂation, reaching
levels of up to 11,700% in 1985. Between 1982 and 1986, economic
activity decreased at an average rate of−3.4%, and the public sector def-
icit was close to 25% of the GDP.
In August 1985, the government established a monetary stabiliza-
tion program. A series of reforms was applied, which included reducing
the size of the primary state companies and the state itself,
renegotiating or rescheduling external debt, establishing unique
uniform tariffs, simplifying the taxation system, and stabilizing the
exchange rate with full price liberalization. By 1988, inﬂation had
dropped to 20%. From 1993 to 1998, economic growth reached an aver-
age annual rate of 4.7%, due in large part to a second wave of reforms
that included changes in the pension system and the market capitaliza-
tion of the most important public companies. Direct foreign investment
doubled during this period, and the ﬁscal deﬁcit reached 4.7% of the
GDP.
In 1998, the Bolivian economy entered into a deceleration period as
a consequence of various external and internal shocks. The international
ﬁnancial crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997 and in Brazil 1998 produced a
drop in export product prices and deterioration in the exchange
terms, affecting national production. Several weather problems consid-
erably affected the agricultural sector. The hydrocarbon sector experi-
enced a contraction associated with the end of the gas expert contract
with Argentina and deferral of gas sales to Brazil. Internally, in 1998,
the Dignity Plan was applied to eradicate the surplus coca crops in the
country. This plan exposed the economy's dependence on producing
and marketing coca. A new customs law went into effect in 1999,
which reduced the contraband that was entering the country from
Chile.
In 2003 and 2004, the international contextwas favorable for Bolivia
due to better prices and lower interest rates in international markets.
However, social and political conﬂicts interrupted the normal economic
activity rate and generated a climate of uncertainty that affected how
the ﬁnancial system functioned and the trust of external investors. Dur-
ing these years, therewas a considerable increase in hydrocarbon sector
exports, which primarily resulted froman increase in the volumeof nat-
ural gas exported to Brazil and a renewal of natural gas exports to
Argentina.
1.2. The political situation
After two decades of military dictatorships, democratic govern-
ments began to lead the country in 1992. Since 2003, social
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movements and governance crises have characterized these govern-
ments. In February 2003, President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, sup-
ported by a political coalition that gave him a majority in Congress
and the state security forces (policy and military), created a new
wage tax to reduce the ﬁscal deﬁcit that in 2002 had reached 9% of
the GDP. Days later, the tax was canceled because of the public's
irate rejection.
The natural gas export project and the dispute over approving the
surpluses generated by this resource caused a new political crisis. In
August 2003, the government decided to go aheadwith a natural gas ex-
port project, retaining the existing legislation that only imposed 18% in
taxes and royalties on operating companies. In 2003, an escalation in
protests against this measure spiraled into a strike impelled by the
neighborhood organizations in the city of El Alto. The strike paralyzed
activities in the city and blocked access to the seat of government for
the rest of the country. The government began using the military and
the police to try to put an end to the conﬂict. The confrontations caused
approximately 80 deaths, and 400 peoplewerewounded. The president
was forced to step down, and Vice President Carlos Mesa assumed the
country's presidency.
In a national vote held on July 18, 2004, citizens backed the new
government's policy in relation to natural gas exploitation. In
January 2005, major protests ignited again against a governmental
decree that called for an increase in fuel prices. The protests became
especially serious in Santa Cruz, where the so-called “Pro Santa Cruz
Civic Movement”, made up of business people, union sectors, and
mayors' ofﬁces, announced the immediate election of an assembly
to deﬁne departmental self-governance. The president of this com-
mittee proclaimed autonomy and announced that he would call for
elections for a new governor and a referendum that would make
Santa Cruz an autonomous state.
On March 7, 2004, faced with the continuing crisis, Mesa extend-
ed an offer to Congress to step down. His resignation was not accept-
ed, and his presidential project was approved to achieve a major
social pact between the main forces and put an end to the imbalance
throughout the country by calling on a constituent assembly to mod-
ify the state's political constitution and to strengthen regional auton-
omy. In May 2004, the Hydrocarbon Law was declared, establishing
an increase in the taxes and royalties paid by foreign oil companies.
The demonstrations returned in force at the end of the month, as
the new law did not satisfy indigenous and mining organizations.
Faced with these obstacles, Mesa resigned and was replaced on
June 9, 2004, by Eduardo Rodriguez, the president of the Supreme
Court of Justice. On December 4, 2005, Bolivia would enter a new
electoral process in which eight candidates aspired for the
presidency.
1.3. The social situation
By 2004, Bolivia was one of the most unequal countries in terms of
the distribution of wealth. The poorest 20% of the population received
4% of the country's income, while the richest 20% of the population re-
ceived 49.1% (United Nations, 2005). Sixty-three percent of the popula-
tion lived in urban areas. Poverty affected 63% of the population.
According to unofﬁcial data, approximately 2 million Bolivians lived
abroad. Argentinawas the country with the largest Bolivian community
(1.5 million), followed by the United States with 250,000 and Spain
with 150,000. The unemployment rate in Bolivia reached 9.2% in 2005.
The informal sector's contribution to the employed population was
83%. Its contribution to the gross domestic product was approximately
25%.
2. Microﬁnance in Bolivia
As a product of the economic policies applied in Bolivia in the
mid-1980s, numerous contingents of unemployed people joined
the so-called informal sector made up of micro, small, and medium
(MSM) enterprises. This sector did not qualify for formal banking
credit, primarily for three reasons: (1) the lack of collateral; (2) the
non-existence of accounting records, which made it difﬁcult to eco-
nomically and ﬁnancially evaluate the customer; and (3) problems
of scale because lending very small amounts of money meant very
little proﬁtability due to the cost of each transaction. To confront
this situation in the late 1980s, the ﬁrst non-proﬁt organizations
(NGOs) arose in Bolivia. Its objective was to provide loans to
micro-enterprises, with donations and subsidized funds as its prima-
ry funding source.
In mid-1990s, two facts marked the beginning of the process to in-
corporate regulated ﬁnancial entities that were dedicated to the MSM
sector. In 1992, Banco Solidario S.A. (BancoSol), which had arisen from
the PRODEM NGO, was incorporated as the ﬁrst bank in Latin America
that was dedicated exclusively to the MSM sector. In 1995, the govern-
ment issued SupremeDecree No. 24,000, which set the norms for creat-
ing private ﬁnancial funds (FFPs) and explained how they would
function as specialized ﬁnancial brokers in providing services to
micro- and small borrowers.
Taking advantage of the new norms, several NGOs incorporated
as FFPs (Caja los Andes, FIE, PRODEM, and Ecofuturo). Other FFPs
arose from totally private entrepreneurial initiatives (Fassil and
Fortaleza). The main advantages of becoming a formal entity were
access to larger ﬁnancing sources for institutional ﬁnanciers through
direct public funds deposit instruments and access to information
from the Central Risk Ofﬁces at the Superintendence of Bank and
Financial Entities.
The FFPs kept the institutional mission of the NGOs fromwhich they
arose. Their main objectivewas to provide greater economic opportuni-
ties for low-income earners but in a sustainable and permanent way,
not as a short-lived achievement that depended on subsidies.
Between 1996 and 1998, several ﬁnancial entities began to aggres-
sively promote consumer loans. The credit agents at these institutions,
who received a commission for increasing their portfolios, were mostly
preoccupied with this beneﬁt but did not properly measure how the
loanwould be repaid. Since the consumer customermarketwas limited,
they made contact with micro- and small entrepreneurs and began to
offer them large loans that surpassed normal amounts. Many micro-
entrepreneurs went into excessive debt and, over time, could not pay
off their old or new debts.
The excessive indebtedness of many micro- and small businesses
would have been of no consequence if their income levels had remained
stable. However, as a result of the economic crisis, Bolivia began to suffer
in early 1998, as its income generation capacity decreased signiﬁcantly.
Associations of small borrowers were created in several regions, and
these associations adopted and used pressure tactics (e.g., marches
and blockades) on ﬁnancial entities and government ofﬁces. The
microﬁnance institutions held meetings with these associations and
their legal advisors to clarify these situations and ask for lists of
consumers who were in arrears to negotiate the most appropriate
solution.
In early 1999, the Superintendence issued new regulations to limit
excessive indebtedness. A key component in these regulations was
that debt should be limited to 25% of salaried workers' veriﬁable in-
comes. Between 1999 and 2000, the more important consumer credit
entities stopped ﬁnancing micro-entrepreneurs.
Although Bolivia's political and economic crisis continued in sub-
sequent years, the ﬁnancial sector that specialized in microﬁnance
had been able to consolidate its market position. The credit portfolios
of these institutions showed major growth in 2002, 2003 and 2004,
as did the number of customers served and their service coverage.
Several of these institutions had been able to attain delinquent loan
rates that were lower compared with those of the formal banking
system, which was accompanied by greater solvency and proﬁts
(see Table 1).
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2.1. Credit methodologies
The primary methodologies used in relation to the informal sector
were savings and loan associations, individual credit, and community
banks. The primary characteristic of solidarity groups is their use of an
intangible guarantee. This type of guaranteemeans that all groupmem-
bers (3 to 6 people) commit to being liable for any possible default on
payment by one of its members. The solidarity group as a whole be-
comes the borrower. The credit granted is sequential, as the group starts
receiving small amounts of money that grows as a function of meeting
the group's obligations. Ranging from personal to mortgage loans, indi-
vidual loans use a variety of guarantees, making it possible for cus-
tomers to create their own business plans in line with the activity
performed.
A community bank is a group of people who are responsible for
managing and returning granted funds. The Executive Institution
(which grants the loan) organizes community associations. Each com-
munity bank appoints a credit committee to handle an external account,
which ismade up of funds granted by the Institution, and an internal ac-
count with bankmembers' funds. The internal account funds are gener-
ated from two sources. The ﬁrst source consists of the savings of
community bankmembers,which is required to be able to access credit.
These savings are deposited into a bank account in the ﬁnancial system
in the community bank's name. The second source consists of interest
that is generated on the external account during the loan cycle (approx-
imately twomonths). Once the Executive Institution funds are received,
they are circulated permanently among the community bank bor-
rowers, as they make weekly payments to principal and interest.
These funds are again loaned to customers, thus making it possible to
capitalize the external account.
2.2. Primary ﬁnancial institutions
In addition to BancoSol, the primary regulated microﬁnance
institutions in Bolivia are Banco Los Andes ProCredit, FIE FPP and
PRODEM FPP.
In 1995, Caja Los Andes was the ﬁrst PFF created in Bolivia. It began
operations in July 1995, based on the ProCredit NGO credit portfolio,
activities, and technology. Its primary objective was to contribute to
the economic and social development of lower-income earners by pro-
viding ﬁnancial services that supportedMSM enterprises and improved
families' quality of life. In January 2005, Caja Los Andes began operating
as Banco Los Andes ProCredit and had equity of approximately US $15
million. The bankwas part of the Grupo ProCredit, a ﬁnancial institution
networkwith 18members in countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America
andAfrica. As ofmid-2005, the bank had various credit products, includ-
ingmicro-enterprise loans from US $50, micro-enterprise lines of credit
for working capital up to US $12,000, loans to small andmedium enter-
prises up to US $750,000, housing loans, and loans backed by security
instruments. Likewise, it offered non-credit services, such as national
drafts and transfers, public utility and service payments, and debit
cards. It had 37 branches spread across La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba,
Tarija, Sucre, Potosi, Trinidad, and six intermediary cities. Close to 800
people worked at the bank.
The Private Financial Fund for Promoting Economic Initiatives (FIE
FFP) arose with the support of the FIE NGO, which belonged to the
Table 1
Customers and branch number evolution.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Urban customers 206,869 259,258 206,984 212,010 198,281
BancoSol and FFP 165,872 217,982 165,418 165,795 144,970
Financial ONG 40,997 41,276 41,566 46,215 53,311
Rural customers 144,661 159,270 145,298 130,780 137,049
BancoSol and FFP 5121 6364 34,196 29,178 27,822
Financial ONG 139,540 152,906 111,102 101,602 109,227
Total 351,530 418,528 352,282 342,790 335,330
Urban branches 103 162 157 148 183
BancoSol and FFP 73 98 92 92 110
Financial ONG 30 64 65 56 73
Rural branches 124 129 135 142 158
BancoSol and FFP 9 8 48 47 44
Financial ONG 115 121 87 95 114
Total 227 291 292 290 341
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos y Entidades Financieras y Finrural
Financial system indicators of delinquency, solvency and proﬁtability
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Portfolio in arrears/gross portfolio
FFP 6.35% 9.14% 12.13% 7.20% 4.83% 3.06%
Banking system (1) 6.69% 11.55% 16.25% 17.94% 17.14% 14.50%
BancoSol 7.02% 12.33% 14.65% 9.46% 6.82% 4.21%
Reserve created/portfolio in arrears
FFP 86.01% 85.27% 108.71% 132.84% 168.22% 159.61%
Banking system (1) 54.83% 54.09% 56.11% 64.38% 75.04% 85.51%
BancoSol 100.02% 78.62% 72.48% 91.2% 104.3% 119.3%
Return on equity
FFP N.A. 3.8% 1.0% 4.0% 12.7% 15.8%
Financial system (1) 8.35% −9.60% −4.26% 0.72% 2.83% −1.18%
BancoSol 9.00% 3.95% 0.46% 1.71% 13.3% 20.9%
Total public deposits (thousands of US $)
FFP and BancoSol 84,836 116,289 142,572 167,426 213,778 270,399
Financial system (1) 3,464,981 3,387,030 3,123,832 2,718,262 2,612,495 2,451,909
(1) Not including BancoSol.
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos y Entidades Financieras.
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Swiss Agency for Aid and Development (COSUDE) and Bolivian inves-
tors. In 1998, it obtained a license to operate as a Private Financial
Fund. In late 2004, it provided services to MSM enterprises through 33
ofﬁces in La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Potosi, Tarija, Sucre, Oruro,
and three intermediary cities. The main FIE FFP products were lines of
credit for micro-entrepreneurs, consumer loans, housing loans, and
small andmicro entrepreneur loans. The average portfolio termwas ap-
proximately 16 months. The bank lending rates ranged between 18%
and 30%, depending on the amount, guarantee, and terms. The
institution's primary funding sources were public and commercial
banking obligations.
The Foundation for the Promotion and Development Microenter-
prise (PRODEM) FFP began operations as a Private Financial Fund in
mid-1999. It had been created based on the 13 years of experience of
PRODEM,whosemission at that time had been to provide ﬁnancial sup-
port to nine Bolivian departments through 75 branches (20 located in
urban areas and 47 in rural areas). The primary credit product was
targeted at MSM enterprises and professionals who worked on their
own. The loans were for up to US $7000, with terms of up to two
years for working capital and up to three years for capital investment.
3. BancoSol
In 1984, ACCION International, an NGO with ofﬁces in the United
States and operations throughout Latin America, recruited a group of in-
ﬂuential Bolivians to head the creation of a micro-enterprise develop-
ment program. As a result, in 1986, ACCION International created
PRODEM as a co-investing foundation among members of the Bolivian
entrepreneurial community, who provided the start-up capital and
leadership, and ACCION, which provided the program with technology
and credit methodology. Initially, PRODEM had 15 employees at its
headquarters in La Paz.
PRODEM offered loans to solidarity groups. Payable weekly, the ini-
tial loans could be for up to $50 at a 2.5% monthly interest on loans in
dollars (and a 4% monthly interest on loans in bolivianos) for a term
of twomonths.When loanswere paid off, the subsequent limits for dol-
lar amounts and loan duration increased.
By 1991, the foundation was covering its costs, but growth was be-
coming increasingly difﬁcult. As a donor-ﬁnanced not-for-proﬁt organi-
zation, PRODEM could not legally accept deposits or take out loans in
the monetary market, which left it with few funding sources: donor
contributions, loans subsidized by development organizations, and
portfolio earnings. The loan demand was growing at a rate of 50% and
substantially exceeded the donor organizations' capacities to ﬁnance
these loans. PRODEM was forced to reduce its loans.
To combat this ﬁnancial challenge, the PRODEM Board of Directors
proposed using a portion of the capital to launch a for-proﬁt commercial
bank. The bank would avoid the donor ﬁnancing bottleneck by raising
foreign investor capital, accepting deposits, and taking out loans in the
open market. After lengthy discussions between PRODEM's manage-
ment, Board of Directors, and donors (e.g., USAID, its most important
donor) in late 1991, PRODEM decided to establish BancoSol through
the following series of transactions:
• PRODEM transferred $1.4 million of its credit portfolio and six of its
most developed branches to BancoSol in exchange for 41% of the
new bank's capital position.
• BancoSol put together capital from foreign investor groups, which in-
cluded the Inter-American Investment Corporation (ICC, with 24%
share) as the primary investor and various international NGOs
(e.g., ACCION, Calmeadow, FUNDES, the Rockefeller Foundation, and
SIDI). Several Bolivian business leaders and their companies acquired
the remaining shares.
• Approximately half of the PRODEM staff went to BancoSol. During the
transition, PRODEM provided ofﬁce space, technical training, and in-
formation technology support.
On February 10, 1992, BancoSol ofﬁcially opened its doors to the
public in La Paz.
3.1. BancoSol, 1992–2000
In the beginning, the bank only offered three products: solidarity
(joint) loans, term deposits, and on-demand deposits. The products
were design to be simple, to facilitate quick decisions, and to be
sufﬁciently ﬂexible to grow with customer needs.
The joint loans were loans extended to groups of three to six
borrowers. The joint guarantee encouraged customers to partner with
others who had the same credit capacity, which would make it possible
for credit advisors to avoid the investigation process and to obtain real
guarantees. The intent was to create homogenous groups in terms to
the size of each business; the total amount to be disbursed could thus
be distributed equitably among group members.
Initial loans were offered for US $50 to US $100 per customer for a
two-month term. When this loan was paid off, the subsequent loan
amount and term could be increased to a maximum of US $5000 per
solidary group for a three-year term. The process began by identifying
borrowers. The bank employees did broad ﬁeld work, investigating
local neighborhoods, and got to know their potential customers. The
loan documentation was minimal, but monitoring was intense and
direct because credit advisors met weekly with each solidarity group.
Payments were made on Monday, and the bank's information system
identiﬁed any late payments that same night. On Tuesdays, the groups
that had not paid were visited to ﬁnd out when they would make
their payments.
Two-thirds of the credit advisors were women, and most held uni-
versity degrees in social science. The BancoSol salary structure was on
a par with NGOs and other organizations in the development ﬁeld.
Commercial bank salaries were comparable to BancoSol salaries, but in-
centive payments caused commercial banking credit advisors to receive
higher total compensation.
In 1992, the average loan size at BancoSol was US $326, with a 35%
interest rate (60% of the loans were in bolivianos). At other commercial
banks, the minimum loan was US $5000; the average loan was greater
than US $10,000; and the interest rate was 15% on loans in dollars
(and 30% on loans in bolivianos).
BancoSol concentrated on the informal urban sector. The bank acted
quickly to establish branches in the largest cities in Bolivia, opening 12
branches in 1993, 9 in 1994, and 3 in 1995. Over time, regional ofﬁces
were opened in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Sucre. TheNational
Bank Ofﬁce organizational structure wasmade up of a general manage-
ment department and four functional management departments. The
bank gained immediate acceptance in the market and great ﬁnancial
success and was the international reference point for micro-enterprise
ﬁnancing. The credit portfolio grew at compounded rates of close to
40% during the 1992–1997 period.
In the mid-1990s, some of the bank's most successful customers
began to leave microﬁnance institutions. Follow-up interviews held
with the customers revealed that as the companies and customers'
credit needs grew, they encountered various kinds of frustrations at
BancoSol (e.g., hitting the joint loan limit of US $5000). Approximately
30% indicated that they left due to problems in their solidarity groups.
As a response, an individual loan product was introduced in July 1999
that was available to the bank's best customers. The credit limit was
set at US $30,000 with a term of up to ﬁve years.
In 1997, founding shareholder ICC, which an investorwith an explic-
it social purpose, reached theﬁve-year limit on its investment period, so
it decided to put its bank shares up for sale. The same year, PRODEM
decided to apply for a FFP license, thus becoming a direct BancoSol
competitor, so it had to liquidate its shareholder position. ACCION be-
lieved that BancoSol was its most successful example and was willing
to increase its investment.
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ACCION, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), and
various local entrepreneurs acquired the offered shares. PRODEM re-
duced its shares from 35% to 20% and resigned from its position on the
Board of Directors.
In 1999 and 2000, the BancoSol performance deteriorated, alongside
the lackluster performance in the rest of the ﬁnancial sector. In late
1999, individual loansmade up 31% of the bank's portfolio, with a delin-
quency rate of just 2.9%. The solidarity loans represented 69% of the
loans, with a delinquency rate of 9%.
The Board of Directors believed that the bank was in crisis. The
bank's ﬁnancial performance was deteriorating, its distinctive product
(i.e., the solidarity loan) was under pressure, and the Board of Directors
and management were divided on how to address the situation.
Attracted by the excellent returns, new shareholders supported the
idea of climbing in the market by concentrating on the small andmedi-
um segments. Headed by ACCION and ProFund, another group advocat-
ed for improving the relationship with the microbusiness segment by
introducing new products that were still missing in the informal sector.
A group led by activists, who remained in the middle management de-
partments, was in favor of keeping the original PRODEM formula; the
Board of Directors did not support this option.
After severalmonths of discussion, the Board of Directors proceeded
with replacing the bank's upper management. In April 2000, it hired
Kurt Koenigsfest as CEO and asked him to prepare a strategy to improve
BancoSol's performance.
When the new management group began to analyze the BancoSol
situation in mid-2000s, several problems came to light. The solidarity
loan had been distorted. Several loans had real guarantees; the amounts
grantedwithin a group varied signiﬁcantly; and a large number of these
loans were being used for purposes that were not productive
(e.g., purchasing vehicles). In addition, a large portion of the individual
loans ﬁnanced since 1999 had repayment problems, as the CEO re-
vealed: “Most of our credit advisors did not have adequate knowledge
to evaluate the customer's individual payment capacity. Between July
1999 and June 2000, the portfolio had more problems than BancoSol
had had in all its history.”
The newmanagement found that each regional ofﬁce was function-
ing as an independent bank. Each regionalmanager had total freedom in
terms of purchases, hiring staff, and services. Accounting was totally
decentralized, and there was no uniform rate schedule; each regional
manager could set bank borrowing and lending rates at will. The bank
culture was fairly informal, according to the CEO: “There were no staff
vacation records, and the staff that worked more than 10 hours one
day could take half of the next day off. The bank employees thought
that the bonanza that had existed at BancoSol would never stop,
which made them very conformist. They thought that the bank had
reached the peak in the microﬁnance area.”
The information system was obsolete and disproportionate. As
needs came up in the system, patches were programmed as temporary
solutions.
A chief ofﬁcer of the BancoSol management team revealed the fol-
lowing: “The image that people had of BancoSol was of a bank that
gave loans. We were only using 10% of our bank license, and the bank
had stagnated with the products it had started with.”
3.2. BancoSol, September 2000–2005
In September 2000, the shareholders, directors, and new manage-
ment team participated in a meeting in which they analyzed the main
problems that the management had discovered. They jointly created a
new mission for BancoSol (see Fig. 1). However, internal discussions
continued about the path that the bank should follow.
In May 2001, the general shareholders' meeting assigned an inde-
pendent person to be the President of the Board. The new President of
the Board identiﬁed the problems BancoSol faced: “The threemain chal-
lenges we had when I took charge of the Board of Directors were
governance problems affecting the bank, different visions about the
bank's future, and a lack of monitoring in the administration.” The CEO
was convinced that the proﬁtability goal could be reached by improving
the bank's relationship with the microbusiness segment, so he
proceeded to prepare a strategic plan for the 2001–2005 period. He ex-
plained the plan's primary goals: “The main directives of the strategic
plan that we brought up with the Board of Directors were to develop
new products and services, improve portfolio quality, optimize and
standardize the operating departments, and achieve cost efﬁciency.”
After several meetings, the Board of Directors decided to support the
new strategy in July 2001. They would remain in the microbusiness
niche, making long-term solvency a priority by sacriﬁcing short-term
proﬁtability.
While a better monitoring and tracking tool was being researched,
the Board decided to use the CAMEL methodology to evaluate bank
functioning on a monthly basis. CAMEL is a ﬁnancial evaluation system
that analyzes a set of indicators grouped inﬁve areas: Equity Sufﬁciency,
Asset Quality, Administration, Results, and Liquidity. The administration
had to present a report on how these indicatorswere changing, compar-
ingBancoSol performancewith that of the institutions thatwere consid-
ered its main competitors: Caja Los Andes, FIE and PRODEM. In
September 2000, several changes began to take place in all of the bank's
functional departments.
3.2.1. Commercial department
According to the CEO, “One of the ﬁrst tasks [BancoSol] carried out
was to open up the bank product portfolio. For example, [the bank]
found that micro-entrepreneurs needed loans to remodel their homes.
Between the end of 2000 and 2001, [BancoSol] went from two to
seven products that targeted microcredit, consumption, housing, and
commerce”. The seven products were: i) Sol Individual, loans targeting
individuals, who own an economic unit so they can generate sufﬁcient
cash ﬂow to amortize the loan and enter the microcredit market;
ii) Solidario, join loans granted to micro entrepreneurs with their own
business in groups of 3 or 4, with a join guarantee, shared by all and in-
divisible; iii) Sol Vivienda, mortgage loans for housing, targeting pur-
chasing, constructing, improving and/or legalizing housing; iv) Sol
Efectivo, loans for salaried workers; v) Sol Vehiculo, auto loans for indi-
viduals; vi) Solicita, commercial loans targeting small and medium en-
terprises for their commercial, production or services business; and
vii) Sol de Oro, loans backed by jewels or gold. For savings products,
the savings account was re-launched, and a new ﬁxed-term deposit
was launched, with interest to be paid monthly.
A series of non-credit services was developed, focusing on national
and international remittances and transfers, public utility and service
payments, tax collection, the provision of guarantee titles, debit cards
and the installation of an automatic teller network. BancoSol signed an
agreement with Banco Velox (2001) and Banco Columbia (2002) of
Argentina to implement a service to senddrafts andmoney transfers be-
tween Argentina and Bolivia. It also signed agreements with Transfer
Exact (2002) and CIAXA (2004) to implement transfers between Spain
and Bolivia. In 2004, it began activities with two remittance agencies
in the US.
Due to product and service portfolio diversiﬁcation, in early 2001,
the bank saw the need to redesign its branches, implementing customer
service platforms to facilitate opening accounts and providing complete
information about the bank's services.
From the beginning, commercial management opted for mass
communication media (e.g., radio and television) to transmit different
advertising campaigns that circulated the new products and services of-
fered by the bank. It also launched an institutional campaign that sought
to change the bank's image from a single-product bank to a diversiﬁed
bank, which was a revolutionary concept, as nobody in the sector be-
lieved that extensive advertising would have any effect on micro-
entrepreneurs. “The campaign got the desired results,” according to
the national Commercial Manager.
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3.2.1.1. Loans. The Chief Credit Ofﬁcer indicated that “[o]one of the ﬁrst
measures taken in this department was to reclassify the loans portfolio
and call each loan by its real name.” By the end of 2000, the solidarity
loan only represented 34% of the total.
In January 2001, the new Chief Credit Ofﬁcer, a position created to
improve portfolio quality, began making changes in the credit policy
guidelines. The autonomy margins for approving loans were modi-
ﬁed that year. For example, the brand managers were authorized to
approve loans with real guarantees for up to US $8000 and without
real guarantees for up to US $6000. Automatic and manual internal
controls were also implemented to facilitate closer monitoring of
how the loaned funds were used and how they were performing.
One of the credit department's greatest achievements was control-
ling the individual loan portfolio deterioration that occurred be-
tween 1998 and 2000. It had been necessary to penalize almost US
$14 million as part of the recovery strategy. This effort was achieved
in the same commercial line of business without any supporting
loans or shareholder capitalization.
In 2002, a new version of the credit policymanual was implemented
nationally to standardize the loan process and to introduce new risk
evaluation tools. The bank also developed a new credit scoring tool
that year, which was oriented toward new customer selection and old
customer segmentation processes. Using historical information and sta-
tistical techniques, the new system made it possible to evaluate the
potential risk in granting loans. The ﬁnal result was a score that enabled
the rating of credit applications in terms of the likelihood of the borrow-
er defaulting on the loan.
In 2003, additional improvements were made to the credit manual.
A new mechanism was implemented to evaluate loans by the amount
ranges, creating instruments to evaluate loans of less than US $1000,
loans between US $1000 and US $6000, and loans of more than US
$6000. This mechanism also created analysis tools for SME loans.
The changes in credit policy and product diversiﬁcation led to
changes in the credit advisor proﬁle. The new credit advisor had to
have a university degree in the areas of management, economics, com-
mercial engineering, or ﬁnance, with relevant experience in the area for
at least one year. In addition, an advisor had to have certain attributes
(e.g., sociability, entrepreneurialism, a personable demeanor) and
have a talent for winning over customers. In 2004, the Credit Depart-
ment was created to ensure compliance with the bank's credit policy,
standardize credit processes and train credit managers and advisors in
the ﬁeld. The bank created the Methodology Process Department to
check and verify that the technology tools and credit processes were
properly applied in the ﬁeld.
Largely due to credit policy changes and the new credit risk analysis
tool, BancoSol reduced its delinquent portfolio from 12.33% in 2000 to
4.21% in 2004. In addition to efforts to improve portfolio quality, the
bank increased reserve coverage in 2004.
BancoSol Vision, Mission and Values




micro and small 
enterprises since 1992, 
allowing easy, quick 
access to high-quality 
integral financial 
services.
We are the top bank in providing 
integral financial services within 
the reach of people, micro 
entrepreneurs and business 
initiatives in Bolivia’s majority 
sectors with whom we take on a 
high degree of commitment. 
We are the bank that 
provides the chance to have a 
better future to lower income 
segments through access to 
high-quality integral 
financial services.
Vision BancoSol will be the number one 
microfinance institution in 
portfolio volume and number of 
customers in each of the regions it 
operates. Its risk profile will be 
less than its direct competition’s, 
with stable loan portfolio. The 
liability structure will be 
optimized through external, 
internal, and public funds deposit, 
maintaining appropriate 
asset/liability management.
We will be the most profitable 
institution with the lowest 
operating expense against assets 
in the mico-finance system, 
supported by appropriate use of 
information technology. Our 
human resources will have the 
appropriate professional profiles 
and will have a high degree of 
motivation and commitment to 
the bank and the customer. The 
bank will provide incentives and 
develop a culture oriented toward 
performance and competitiveness. 
Be an innovative 




development, progress, and 
quality of life for low income 
people.
Values Service, Integrity, 
Reciprocity, Responsibility, 
Coherence, Commitment.
Fig. 1. BancoSol Vision, mission and values.
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3.2.2. Information systems
According to the Chief SystemsOfﬁcer, BancoSol found itself “in pos-
session of obsolete, totally decentralized equipment and systems, so the
ﬁrst job in the department was to centralize all the information system
processes in 2002.” Two latest-generation servers were installed, mak-
ing it possible to do away with the regional servers. The bandwidth
was extended for data and communication ﬂow, making it possible to
consolidate and connect all online operations nationally. The Coopera-
tive Open Banking Information System (COBIS) asset and liability soft-
ware was updated to the latest version on the market.
In 2004, the operating and direct customer contact departments
were modernized and standardized. More than 350 leading-edge per-
sonal computers were acquired to beneﬁt the operations departments,
credit advisors, service platforms, and the branch teller area. The Chief
Systems Ofﬁcer reﬂected on these technological updates: “Since 2004,
the technology department developed several projects to be able to
provide products and services of more value to our customers. We
developed customer selection and segmentation scoring for our credit
advisors and also provided them with portable electronic tools to facil-
itate promoting products and collecting and evaluating customer infor-
mation. We also worked on improving connectivity with various
institutions abroad to become a remittance headquarters for a large
part of the national ﬁnancial system. During all these years, we had to
work on putting patches on the main software because the bank's posi-
tionwould not allow for a large-scale investment in this area. At the end
of 2002, we began working on a general replacement for the bank's in-
formation technology system. This project will be ﬁnished in 2006.”
3.2.2.1. Administration and human resources. In 2001, the administration
was faced with the challenge of reducing cost and standardizing the
bank's administrative process. According to the Chief Administrative Of-
ﬁcer, “To reduce costs, limits were established for the regional ofﬁces'
expense autonomy—any expense above US $300 had to be authorized
by the Chief Operating and Financial Ofﬁcer and the CEO.” Payments
for manager cellular phones were also limited to 130 bolivianos (less
than US $20) per month.
Each of the institution's expense items was analyzed. The Chief
Operating and Financial Ofﬁcer explained: “For example, we found that
37 branches were leased by the bank and that close to 30 were leased
at prices above themarket. Theywere thus renegotiatedwith the proper-
ty owners, and the expense for this item was reduced by 30%.”
Due to the divergence among regional processes, the customer
service schedule, functions, roles, reporting structures, responsibilities,
accounting processes, and uniform charts of account applications were
standardized.
As part of the strategy, it was necessary to add new functional de-
partments and reinforce the existing ones. For example, in January
2001, BancoSol created two new positions: a new Chief Credit Ofﬁcer
and a Deputy Chief of Credit Risk.
All changes made in these years caused deterioration in the opera-
tional climate, so the new CEO organized a series of workshops at all re-
gional ofﬁces to communicate the bank's new strategy and values. These
high-impact training workshops were vivid and dynamic because they
did not follow the typical formal academic routine, using low and high
ropes courses and leadership and teamwork workshops.
Table 2
BancoSol performance indicators.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Capital
Equity (millions of US $) 14.3 14.6 14.5 14.8 16.8 18.6
Equity/assets 14.5% 15.9% 14.8% 14.2% 14.7% 13.5%
Reserves/overdue 1 day or more 100.0% 78.6% 72.5% 91.2% 104.3% 119.3%
Reserves/overdue N30 days 127.9% 101.1% 83.8% 104.6% 120.0% 136.2%
Overdue/equity 40.2% 65.7% 81.7% 51.7% 37.0% 24.5%
Assets
Branches (#)* 43 37 35 34 36 34
Employees (#) 629 554 506 503 581 592
Assets (millions of US $) 99.2 91.9 98.9 104.3 114.3 138.2
Portfolio (millions of US $) 82.3 77.8 81.1 80.9 91.2 108.6
Portfolio growth 11.1% −5.4% 4.3% −0.3% 12.7% 19.1%
Overdue 1 day or more/portfolio 7.0% 12.3% 14.7% 9.5% 6.8% 4.2%
Overdue 30 days or more/portfolio 5.9% 9.6% 12.7% 8.2% 5.9% 3.7%
Fixed assets (millions of US $) 6.8 6.4 5.6 5.4 5.6 6.2
Administration
Financial income/average portfolio 33.9% 30.1% 26.8% 23.9% 22.8% 22.8%
Financial expenses/average portfolio 9.6% 9.0% 7.2% 5.5% 5.1% 5.0%
Bad debt expenses/average portfolio 4.6% 5.0% 5.6% 6.4% 2.6% 1.7%
Administrative expenses/average portfolio 18.2% 15.4% 14.8% 12.4% 14.0% 13.6%
Administrative expenses/average assets 13.9% 12.8% 12.5% 10.0% 11.1% 10.9%
Productivity
Number of credit advisors 242 195 159 192 217 218
Customers per credit advisor 302 313 338 265 261 304
Number of loans 30,199 35,816 39,269 36,941 39,968 46,221
Portfolio (millions of US $) 122.5 80.8 64.4 64.8 74.1 49.8
Income
Service fees (millions of US $) 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2
Net income (millions of US $) 1.27 0.55 0.06 0.25 2.23 3.89
Liquidity
Total public deposits (millions US $) 54.8 54.9 61 61.9 69.7 80.8
Total number of accounts (savings + ﬁxed term) 30,050 32,728 46,665 53,341 53,600 61,823
Total deposit growth 1.1% 0.2% 11.1% 1.5% 12.5% 15.9%
Available + temporary investments/assets 12.0% 11.2% 14.6% 17.2% 13.3% 16.4%
Source: BancoSol.
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Table 3




PRODEM FIE BancoSol LOS
ANDES




(Net overdue portfolio)/equity −2.08% 18.67% 6.70% −0.02% −1.60% 11.40% 15.40% −2.20% −8.00% −9.50% −9.20% −28.50%
(Net overdue portfolio + marketable
goods)/equity
8.75% 18.67% 6.80% −0.02% 6.80% 15.10% 15.60% −2.20% −3.40% −7.50% −9.10% −28.50%
Reserve/equity 47.16% 55.11% 30.30% 53.33% 38.60% 22.40% 23.30% 29.30% 32.50% 33.10% 39.20% 50.10%
(Assets + contingency)/equity 7.1 10.4 8.6 7.4 6.8 8.5 11.0 7.3 7.5 9.4 12.7 8.1
Asset
Net overdue portfolio/gross portfolio −0.38% 2.02% 1.00% 0.00% −0.30% 1.60% 1.80% −0.30% −1.40% −1.20% −0.90% −4.00%
(Net overdue portfolio + marketable
goods)/gross portfolio
1.60% 2.02% 1.00% 0.00% 1.30% 2.20% 1.80% −0.30% −0.60% −1.00% −0.90% −4.00%
Total reserve/gross portfolio 8.63% 5.95% 4.40% 7.53% 7.10% 3.20% 2.70% 4.50% 5.60% 4.30% 3.90% 6.90%




9.42% 10.98% 11.80% 9.50% 11.00% 10.10% 11.30% 9.90% 9.90% 10.90% 12.70% 10.70%
Administrative expenses/total expenses 29.24% 39.36% 33.60% 20.68% 58.60% 60.90% 52.20% 57.60% 54.70% 59.40% 58.40% 54.60%
Earnings
Net income/ﬁnancial income 1.32% 7.38% 4.80% 12.25% 11.60% 11.00% 6.70% 15.30% 17.20% 8.50% 8.50% 15.80%
Financial income/(assets + contingencies) 18.14% 19.65% 18.70% 19.37% 18.00% 16.50% 15.40% 18.10% 18.20% 17.00% 18.20% 20.20%
Net income/(assets + contingencies) 0.24% 1.45% 0.90% 2.37% 2.10% 1.80% 1.00% 2.80% 3.20% 1.50% 1.60% 3.20%
Net income/equity 1.71% 15.13% 7.80% 17.63% 13.30% 15.50% 11.40% 20.30% 20.90% 12.40% 18.60% 24.70%
Other net operating income/ﬁnancial income 4.65% 4.34% 8.40% 4.47% 6.50% 3.00% 11.50% 7.20% 6.50% 4.10% 12.70% 7.60%
Liquidity
(Cash + temporary investment)/short-term
liability
119.86% 99.29% 62.60% 164.36% 73.40% 116.70% 56.20% 96.30% 147.90% 181.90% 99.70% 116.40%
Cash + cash equivalents/public liability 9.18% 6.62% 7.20% 4.94% 4.90% 7.70% 7.10% 11.80% 8.40% 7.90% 9.30% 14.60%













To increase the value 
of the Bank
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To increase income for 
other operative services
To optimize the maturity 
match, currency match 
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To optimize the 
structure of funds
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productiveness 
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opportune response
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and competitive conditions
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of control
To reach the simplicity in
the delivery of our
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To promote and to innovate the
Technological resources
and of information 
To innovate products and financial
services with competitive and
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To select qualified 
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and with the suitable 
To raise the competences and
to promote the development
of our personnel
To improve the labor 
climate
promoting the 
To have a system of 
compensations and incentives 
based on the performance
Fig. 2. Strategic map.
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The Human Resources Department put together a series of training
sessions each year about customer service quality, ﬁnancial analysis,
scoring, products and services, credit risk analysis, the bank's credit pro-
cesses, and the new version of the credit policy. The CEO said that
BancoSol “started training all staff members who wanted to continue
with (the bank) so that they could perform their duties in line with
the changes.”
3.2.2.2. Finance and control.As for liquidity indices, BancoSol kept liquid-
ity levels above the national banking system average in the latter years.
The decision to maintain these levels was in response to the strategy
that was designed to help the bank be prepared in case of any contin-
gency and potentially provide an immediate response to customers
who were withdrawing their funds.
As the CFO explaining, “People thought that micro-entrepreneur did
not save. Nevertheless, in the periods of crisis, they brought theirmoney
to the bank as a means of protection, while the rest of the banking sys-
tem showed a major fund outﬂow.” As part of its strategy, the bank re-
duced its ﬁnancial costs by changing the funding structure and reached
70% in public deposits in savings and term accounts in 2004. The im-
provements in the operating, commercial and credit departments bore
fruit. Proﬁts for 2003 reached US $2.23 million (see Table 2) and had a
return on equity of 13.3% higher than Caja Los Andes and PRODEM
(see Table 3).
In early 2004, the Board of Directors decided to use the Balance Score
Card as amonitoring and tracking tool. Alongwith the administration, the
directors proceeded to prepare a strategicmap, suggesting that objectives
and indicators be evaluated from the perspective of learning, growth, in-
ternal, customer, and ﬁnancial considerations (see Figs. 2 and 3).
3.2.3. Social responsibility
In 2004, BancoSol shareholders and top management decided to
complement the ﬁnancial results with social impact indicators. The fol-
lowing elements were introduced into the institutional culture:
i) endure value in the products and services, manifested by satisfaction
and quality, ii) maintain active participation in the community served
throughout the country, iii) participate actively in caring for the envi-
ronment and creating an ecological awareness among our customers
and employees, and iv) facilitate and empower the development of all
BancoSol's employees, with equal opportunities and conditions for all.
As part of its social responsibility initiatives, the bank promoted profes-
sional development of its employees. For example, in 2004, 7 employees
received a post-graduate degree, 5 employees ﬁnished their graduate
degree, and three ﬁnished their Master's degree.
With ACCION's technical support, the bankwas able to develop a re-
port model called the Social Score Card. The purpose of the instrument
was tomonitor progress for poor customers and consisted inmeasuring
customer poverty through the income and expense variables for
customers' homes. The informationwas obtained during the credit eval-
uation process for each customer (see Table 4). In addition inmid-2004,
the bank evaluated more than 9000 customers who, in January 2000,
applied for microcredit. The results showed that 41% of these customers
improved their income and 28%maintained it. For the future, the bank's
Profit and Loss indicators
Objective Indicator
Financial Perspective
Increase Profits Net income / Average equity (ROE)
Maintain optimum solvency levels Net overdue portfolio / equity
Maintain optimum liquidity levels Available funds / public liabilities 
Increase income from other operating services Other net operating income / financial income
Increase financial income Income per portfolio / average gross portfolio
Optimize matching terms, currencies, and rates Average match weighted by term
Optimize funding structure Financial expenses / deposits with average cost
Improve productivity and administrative efficiency Administrative expenses / average gross portfolio
Maintain optimum portfolio quality levels Net overdue portfolio /  gross portfolio
Customer Perspective
Increase customers at current and new locations Market share
Keep customers Customer desertion index
Show the image of Total Banking specialized in micro 
finances and having social responsibility Top of mind (with all mentions)
Provide excellent customer service Ratio of perception about service in the teller area
Provide efficient, quick, and timely response Number of days until disbursement for loans for less than US$ 1,000
Offer equitable, competitive prices and conditions Ratio of perception about interest rate in relation to 
value received
Internal perspective
Optimize and standardize internal processes Number of optimized processes
Attain unaffectedness and simplicity in delivering our 
products and services Number of exclusive customers / total customer
Empower and innovate technological information 
resources Bank automation level
Innovate financial products and services with comparative 
and competitive advantages
Number of new products or services /  total products 
and services
Learning and Growth Perspective
Select qualified personnel with the appropriate profile Number of staff members with degrees/ number of 
employees
Elevate competences and promote staff development Average training time per employee
Improve the work climate, promoting communication and 
teamwork Turnover index
Have a performance-based compensation system and 
incentives
Number of staff members under the compensation 
floor
Source: BancoSol  
Fig. 3. Proﬁt and loss indicators.
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directors wanted to place some indicators on the Balance Score Card to
be able to monitor bank's social actions.
4. Future challenges
In December 2004, the investment period for several shareholders
ended. The shares of ACCION investment, Mi Banco del Peru, a group
of Argentinean investors and member of BancoSol management
acquired more shares. The year 2005 brought major challenges for
BancoSol. “We have to understand the setting where BancoSol operates
and adapt to its changes. For example, the microﬁnance industry is an
industry that grows in period of crisis. Several opportunities appeared
before us to increase market share, we can grow in the rural area or in
the SME segment, or ﬁnd a way to provide to Bolivian emigrants
abroad,” the President of the Board of Directors reﬂected.
Kurt and his team had to come up with a strategy for the next three
years for the next Board of Directors' meeting. How can you achieve lead-
ership in the microﬁnance segment when competition is more aggres-
sive? How do you grow while maintaining your mission to serve the
low-income sectorswith huge social impact and at the same time contin-
ue to be proﬁtable? There were the main questions they had to answer.
Appendix 1. BancoSol S.A. The recovery strategy, 2000–2004. High
reliability organizations analysis.
Since its creation in 1992, BancoSolwas ranked as the number one in-
stitution in the microﬁnance market in Bolivia, growing rapidly during
the period 1992–1997. In the late 90s, high supply of microﬁnance ser-
vices led to indebtedness of many micro and small entrepreneurs. Addi-
tionally, the country entered an economic crisis in 1998. Given the
instability of their income, many micro and small entrepreneurs were
unable to pay its debts. During 1999 and 2000 BancoSol performance de-
teriorated and the Board of Directors felt that the Bank was in crisis.
BancoSol then showed three characteristics of the High Reliability
Organizations (HRO) (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999): Commitment
to resilience, deference to expertise and preoccupation with failure.
In late 2000, the Bank began its transformationwith a strategic plan-
ning process. During the formulation and implementation of its recov-
ery strategy (2000–2004), BancoSol developed one of the principles of
the HRO, commitment to resilience. The Board of Directors and top
management analyzed and faced their mistakes and learned from
them. The commitment to resilience was evident from the very top of
the organization. The strategic changes are more effective if they are
in these guided and are committed to the highest hierarchical levels
(Golden & Zajac, 2001). The Board of Directors, aware of the challenges,
decided to invite and appoint as its President an outside personwith ex-
tensive experience in the microﬁnance area. The Board also deﬁned a
new mission that would guide the institution in the process of change.
These actions have theoretical and empirical support in the literature
of strategy. More diversity on boards is associated with a greater likeli-
hood of strategic change (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). In
addition, there is evidence in the literature that more power given to a
person outside the organization is related to the magnitude of strategic
change (Gibbs, 1993). The newmanagementmademajor changes in all
the main areas: credit, information systems, marketing, and human re-
sources. In the marketing area, they realized that the bankwas not fully
using its license focusing on a couple of loan products and no longer
responding to customer demand and the economic environment of
the country. The management decided to open its product portfolio
from two to seven products credit and add several non-credit ﬁnancial
services such as remittances and transfers. In the area of credit they
proceeded to change credit policies and gavemore autonomy to agency
managers. This is another feature of the HRO, deference to expertise.
Since the branchmanagers knewmore about the features and opportu-
nities of microﬁnance institutions in their regions, they were able to
make reasonably credit decisions. Senior management delegated agen-
cy managers the approval of loans for amounts up to $6000. In the area
of information systems the bank proceeded to centralize IT processes
and provide to credit advisors equipment and the latest generation soft-
ware for better decision-making. During this period, the Bank demon-
strated its ability to adapt and recover to position itself as the best
institution in the Bolivian ﬁnancial system in 2004.
The recovery process led BancoSol to develop another principle of
the HRO, preoccupation with failure. In late 2004, the General Manager
of BancoSol and his team analyzed and developed the Bank's new strat-
egy for the coming years. This time was no longer a reactive process,
they wanted to anticipate problems. The topmanagementwas cautious
with their success andwanted to be prepared to face the changes in the
environment looking for opportunities for improvement.
Appendix 2
BancoSol S.A.
The recovery strategy, 2000–2004
Teaching note
Authors: Luis Noel Alfaro, Karina Caballero, Mauricio Melgarejo,
Enrique Ogliastri
2.1. Case study overview
BancoSol was established as the ﬁrst Latin American bank specializing
in serving micro-entrepreneurs. Since its onset in La Paz, Bolivia, in 1992
it had achieved excellent results, becoming an international microcredit
benchmark. However, by mid-2000 its performance declined due to ex-
ternal and internal factors. As a result, BancoSol's management team
launched a strategy leading BancoSol to be rated as the best bank in the
Bolivian ﬁnancial system in 2004. This strategy reliedmainly on develop-
ing new products and services, improving portfolio quality, optimizing
and standardizing operations, and achieving cost efﬁciency.
In 2005 BancoSol had several opportunities to enlarge its market
share by growing either in rural areas or in the SMEs sector or byﬁnding
ways to extend credit to Bolivian migrants at their destinations.
Table 4




















54.6% 50.3% 57.6% 336.69 3.411 3.5% 20.2%
Level 2
Vulnerable customersb
16.1% 16.7% 16.0% 455.68 3.928 2.9% 25.5%
Level 3
Not poorc
29.3% 33.0% 26.4% 591.99 4.237 3.0% 30.7%
a Customers below the poverty line.
b Customers up to 50% above the poverty line.
c Customers more than 50% above the poverty line.
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2.2. Teaching objectives
a. Analyzing the effect on BancoSol's strategy resulting from changes in
customer preferences and the external environment.
b. Assessing how BancoSol measures the social impact of its activities.
c. Assessing the effect of changes in BancoSol's strategy on its perfor-
mance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion.
2.3. Guiding questions
a. What were the main causes leading to a decline in performance in
both the microﬁnance industry and at BancoSol S.A.?
b. Why did the new strategy succeed? Can competitors replicate/emu-
late BancoSol strategy?
c. What course of action must BancoSol take to keep growing?
d. Are BancoSol's CSR measures adequate to evaluate corporate social
responsibility?
What indicatorsmust be added to the Balanced Scorecard to proper-
ly monitor BancoSol's social performance?
e. What was the effect of changes in BancoSol's strategy on its perfor-
mance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion?
2.4. Case study analysis (80 min)
Question # 1:Whatwere themain causes leading to a decline in per-
formance in both the microﬁnance industry and at BancoSol S.A.?
(10 min)
In the early 90s BancoSol was the only regulated bank in the
microﬁnance industry. Then the Private Financial Funds Act (Ley de
Fondos Financieros Privados, FFPs) went into effect, resulting in lower
barriers to entry in the industry, increased supply of microﬁnance
services,more competition, and lower interest rates (viamarket, not de-
cree). Then Chilean suppliers of consumer credit entered the market
and targeted the clients of microﬁnance institutions, leading to over-
indebtedness of clients and a decline in debt collection. In this context
some institutions began using “harsh collection techniques” which re-
sulted, among other things, in the emergence of debtor associations.
As a result of the arrival of new competitors offering consumer cred-
it, customers' tastes and preferences changed from solidarity groups to
individual loans.
Question # 2: Why did the new strategy succeed? (30 min)
BancoSol's initial strategy was implicit rather than formal. Since it
was the ﬁrst microﬁnance institution regulated in Latin America,
growth in the early years was easier, since there was little competition.
Process ﬂexibility and informal culture allowed BancoSol to provide
customized, agile loans to customers. However, a combination of crisis
and economic uncertainty, increased competition, and BancoSol's own
growth made it necessary to develop a new strategy.
Key competitive elements in BancoSol's strategy included,
1. Adjusting BancoSol's mission and vision.
2. Diversifying products and customizing product portfolio.
3. Diversiﬁcation market segment.
4. Improving operational procedures.
5. Changing image and positioning BancoSol.
What? Products and Services















- Informal culture 
- Staff with social 
experience.
- Direct marketing 
aimed to customers
- Functional structure 
Mission
We are a leading, solvent, 
efficient, profitable bank 
supporting micro-entrepreneur 
and small-business 
development since 1992, 
providingsimple, quick access 
to comprehensive, high-quality 
financial services. Our 
corporate culture is open to 
change, based on people, and 
focused on customers, 
encouraging career 
Fig. 1. BancoSol — strategic diamond diagram 1992–2000.
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6. Using differentiation strategies as key development approach.
7. Developing staff.
BancoSol's new strategy was successful as all ﬁve elements in the
Strategic Diamond (Alfaro, 2003) were consistent with each other and
with changes in the environment (change in customers' preference
from solidarity groups to individual loans), enabling BancoSol to offer
a wide range of products and services through more productive, efﬁ-
cient, agile processes. These changes helped BancoSol increase its return
on equity from 3.95% in 2000 to 20.9% in 2004. Figs. 1 and 2 display the
Strategic Diamonds before 2004 and after 2005.
Question # 3: Can competitors replicate/emulate BancoSol strategy?
(5 min)
Banking products are intangible and easy to emulate so product diver-
siﬁcation was not the core of BancoSol strategy. Rather, its centerpiece
was changes to internal factors (human resources, information systems,
process automation and standardization, funding structure, and so on)
which allowed BancoSol to attain higher ROE than its main competitors.
Even though this strategy can be effective in the short term, in the
medium term it can be emulated by rivals, so BancoSol only had just a
ﬁrst mover advantage. However, a beneﬁt BancoSol highlighted was
the fact that its bank license allowed it to engage in non-lending
operations that its FFP-licensed competitors could not perform. This
advantage was not sustainable, though, as Caja los Andes became a
licensed bank in January 2005.
To maintain its competitive edge BancoSol had to continually im-
prove, reﬁne, and innovate operations, and stay open to new changes
in resource management. It needed to avoid stagnation, analyze chang-
es in both themarket and its own environment, and remain sensitive in
order to respond to changes by adapting its own structure.
Question # 4: What course of action must BancoSol take to keep
growing? (5 min)
Evidence from the case indicates that most of the growth in the
microﬁnance market was taking place in rural areas and loans to small
and medium-sized entrepreneurs. Since BancoSol had no presence
in these segments, there were growth opportunities to be pursued there.
2.4.1. Advantages fostering BancoSol's growth in SMEs and the rural sector
- Rural areas not yet fully served by ﬁnancial organizations. Wide
range of BancoSol products and services.
- Good local image. Strong capital structure. Highly-qualiﬁed staff.
2.4.2. Disadvantages hindering BancoSol's growth in the rural sector
- Lack of coverage in intermediate cities and the rural sector. No loan
technology developed for SMEs and rural microcredit. PRODEM
What? Products and Services
Solidarity loans Savings Account
Individual loans Time deposits































We are the bank offering lower-
income groups the opportunity 
for a better future through 
access to comprehensive, high-
quality financial services. 
Vision 
Being the leader, innovator,
and benchmark for local and
international microfinance by
promoting development,
progress, and quality of life for
lower-income individuals
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Table 1
Financial inclusion: BancoSol — 1999–2004 performance indicators.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Extent of outreach indicators
Volume of loan portfolio (US $ M) 82.30 77.40 81.10 80.90 91.20 108.60
Number of borrowers 73,073 67,082 61,338 50,904 42,831 71,609
% of population with access to BancoSol loans 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.8%
Volume of deposit portfolio (US $ M) 54.80 54.90 61.00 61.90 69.70 81.50
Number of depositors 32,748 30,004 43,698 48,341 N.A. N.A.
% of population with access to BancoSol S.A. savings accounts 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% N.A. N.A.
Share of the deposit portfolio in total liabilities 64.6% 71.3% 79.7% 73.9% 71.6% 68.1%
Total of active/passive customers 105,821 97,086 105,036 99,245 N.A. N.A.
% of population with access to savings and loan service 1.3% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% N.A. N.A.
Income from other services (US $ M) 1.70 1.40 2.30 1.60 2.10 2.60
Income from other services/total income. 6.9% 5.4% 11.0% 8.1% 10.0% 10.0%
Depth of outreach indicators
Average loan size 1126.09 1154.56 1212.8 1487.7 2126.01 1517.89
Percentage of women among total borrowers 74.0% 63.0% 60.0% 68.6% 54.9% 49.7%
Average size of deposits (US $) 1673 1830 1396 1280 N.A. N.A.
Convenience indicator
Number of points of service 43 37 35 34 36 34
Quality indicators
Growth of loan portfolio 11.1% −5.9% −4.0% 1.8% 20.2% 19.4%
Growth of deposit portfolio 1.1% 0.2% 11.1% 1.5% 12.6% 16.9%
Effective lending rate 28.4% 30.6% 25.6% 24.4% 21.1% 21.1%
Effective deposit rate 8.6% 10.3% 8.5% 6.3% 6.0% 6.2%
PAR N30 days 5.9% 9.6% 12.7% 8.2% 5.9% 3.7%
Loss rate from bad debt 0.0% 0.0% 10.6% 0.0% 2.3% 1.2%
Overhead (operating expenses/loan portfolio) 16.3% 15.2% 14.0% 12.7% 13.4% 12.5%
Permanence indicators: sustainability of ﬁnancial inclusion
Sustainability Index (SI) = income/expense 1.26 1.25 1.25 1.36 1.25 1.28
Return on assets (ROA) = proﬁts/assets 1.4% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3% 1.9% 3.1%
Return on equity (ROE) = proﬁts/equity 9.0% 3.9% 0.4% 1.8% 13.2% 22.2%
Source: Microﬁnance Information Exchange, Inc. [online] http://www.mixmarket.org/mﬁ/bancosol/report. Accessed November 2013.
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leadership in the rural sector. Growing competition in the
microﬁnance sector.
Question # 5: Are BancoSol's CSR measures adequate to evaluate
corporate social responsibility? What indicators must be added to the
Balanced Scorecard to properlymonitor BancoSol's social performance?
(15 min).
The CSR Hexagon model (Ogliastri, 2003; Ogliastri et al., 2009) will
be used to evaluate BancoSol social responsibility.
BancoSol's measurements of its performance in terms of social re-
sponsibility include only a few categories, that is, customers, em-
ployees, and income distribution among publics of interest (see
Table 3).
In addition to pointing to BancoSol's economic performance,
some indicators in the Balance Score Card can also indicate
BancoSol's social responsibility. For example, the Cash/Public Liabili-
ties indicator measures BancoSol's responsibility to maintain opti-
mum levels of liquidity allowing it to respond to its depositors in
case of crisis.
As a part of BancoSol's current measures of social responsibility, the
following items can be added to its Balance Score Card (BSC):
• Customers: (a) percentage of poor customers (level 1), (b) percentage
of new poor customers, and (c) percentage of customers who
succeeded in improving their revenues.
• Suppliers: percentage of Bank revenue distributed to suppliers.
• Community: percentage of Bank revenues devoted to donations to the
community.
• Employees: (a) average training hours per employee, (b) number of
employees with degrees/number of employees (these indicators are
already included in the BSC).
• Organizational Strengthening: percentage of Bank revenues devoted
to tax payments.
Some new responsibility indicators that may be added to BancoSol
Balance Score Card in various categories include,
• Suppliers: (a) percentage of suppliers engaged in social responsibility
practices, (b) supplier satisfaction.
• Environment: number of environmental projects implemented
(e.g., energy savings and paper savings).
• Customers: percentage of customer complaints solved.
• Transparence, values, and anti-corruption practices: (a) number of
audits per year and/or audit hours per year, (b) number of employees
trained in asset laundering.
Question # 6: What was the effect of changes in BancoSol's strategy
on its performance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion? (10 min, including
closing).
As a development ﬁnance institution, ﬁnancial inclusion is a crucial
issue at BancoSol S.A. We will use the conceptual framework known
as the Star of Financial Inclusion, developed by Prof. Luis Noel Alfaro,
to assess the effect of changes in BancoSol's strategy on BancoSol's per-
formance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion.
First we can see that BancoSol S.A. is explicitly committed to ﬁ-
nancial inclusion; its mission clearly states the Bank's purpose to
provide lower-income segments of society with access to ﬁnancial
services.
The data in Table 1 of this note can be used to evaluate the effect of
strategic changes in BancoSol on its performance in terms of ﬁnancial
inclusion. Table 2 shows signiﬁcant improvement of BancoSol's perfor-
mance from 1999 to 2012 in every dimension of the Star of Financial In-
clusion except for depth of ﬁnancial inclusion; BancoSol lost depth as a
result of implementing an upscaling process bymoving to cater to small
and medium-sized enterprises in addition to microenterprises.
Table 2
Banco Solidario — BancoSol 2005–2012 performance indicators.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Outreach indicators
Volume of loan portfolio (US $ M) 130.10 163.10 209.00 294.20 351.80 439.80 585.60 733.00
Number of borrowers 85,000 103,786 121,207 109,763 129,705 145,608 169,251 193,208
% of population with access to BancoSol loans 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8%
Volume of deposit portfolio (US $ M) 97.40 146.10 169.50 261.70 342.90 420.10 536.20 634.30
Number of depositors 76,587 111,946 169,507 209,845 323,022 414,154 484,973 547,222
% of population with access to BancoSol S.A. savings account 0.8% 1.2% 1.8% 2.1% 3.2% 4.1% 4.7% 5.2%
Share of deposit portfolio in total liabilities 62.6% 72.4% 71.1% 74.1% 76.8% 77.5% 80.3% 77.2%
Total of active/passive customers. 161,587 215,732 290,714 319,608 452,727 559,762 654,224 740,430
% of population with access to savings and loan service 1.7% 2.3% 3.0% 3.2% 4.5% 5.5% 6.3% 7.1%
Income from other services (US $ M) 2.50 3.70 5.10 2.60 2.70 1.40 2.70 1.60
Income from other services/total income. 8.7% 10.2% 11.7% 4.5% 3.7% 1.7% 2.6% 1.3%
Penetration indicators
Average loan size 1530.66 1571.76 1723.99 2680.46 2712.5 3020.68 3459.66 3793.64
Percentage of women among total borrowers 48.4% 46.4% 46.4% 47.2% 48.0% 48.1% 48.1% 47.5%
Average size of deposits 1272 1305 1000 1247 1061 1014 1106 1159
Source: Microﬁnance Information Exchange, Inc. [online] http://www.mixmarket.org/mﬁ/bancosol/report. Accessed November 2013
Convenience indicator
Number of points of service N.A. N.A. N.A. 59 53 69 70 81
Quality indicators
Growth of loan portfolio 19.7% 25.4% 28.1% 40.8% 19.6% 25.0% 33.1% 25.2%
Growth of deposit portfolio 19.6% 49.9% 16.0% 54.4% 31.0% 22.5% 27.7% 18.3%
Effective lending rate 20.1% 19.7% 18.6% 18.6% 19.5% 18.1% 16.8% 17.1%
Effective deposit rate 5.8% 4.8% 5.6% 5.1% 5.1% 3.3% 2.8% 3.0%
Portfolio at risk N30 days 3.9% 3.7% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7%
Loss rate from bad debt 0.4% 0.2% 2.2% 1.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.3% 0.4%
Overhead (operating expenses/loan portfolio) 11.7% 11.7% 11.1% 11.2% 9.9% 10.2% 10.5% 10.6%
Permanence indicators
Sustainability Index (SI) = Income/Expense. 1.24 1.33 1.29 1.22 1.32 1.40 1.40 1.36
Return on assets (ROA) = Proﬁts/Assets. 2.7% 2.3% 3.0% 0.7% 2.6% 2.2% 2.3% 2.1%
Return on equity (ROE) = Proﬁts/Equity. 22.2% 22.8% 31.6% 8.1% 33.9% 30.1% 30.3% 28.8%
Source: Luis Noel Alfaro (2003) based on Microﬁnance Information Exchange, Inc. [online] http://www.mixmarket.org/mﬁ/bancosol/report. Accessed November 2013.
14 K. Caballero et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article as: Caballero, K., et al., Banco Solidario S.A.: The recovery strategy, 2000–2004, Journal of Business Research (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.03.010
2.5. Conclusion
According to information until 2012, BancoSol had really impressive
performance in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion in the following dimensions
of the Star of Financial Inclusion: Extent of Outreach, Depth of Outreach,
Geographic Convenience, Quality of Outreach and Permanence and Sus-
tainability of Financial Inclusion. BancoSol S.A. received in 2008 the
Award of Excellence from the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) as the best regulated microﬁnance institution in Latin America.
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